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We introduce a novel form of decoy-state technique to make the single-photon Bennett 1992
protocol robust against losses and noise of a communication channel. Two uninformative states are
prepared by the transmitter in order to prevent the unambiguous state discrimination attack and
improve the phase-error rate estimation. The presented method does not require strong reference
pulses, additional electronics or extra detectors for its implementation.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a way to dis-
tribute secret keys between two distant parties with prov-
able security [1, 2, 3, 4]. Despite the general principles of
QKD are now well known, there is no definite answer yet
about its effective use in the real world, being it depen-
dent on practical figures of merit like the transmission
rate, the working distance and even the production cost
of a specific implementation. A useful criterion in such
intricate situations is that of the simplest choice. In case
of cryptography this is particularly desirable for it allows
general and reliable security proofs together with efficient
and low-cost practical realizations.
The simplest QKD protocol was conceived by C. H.
Bennett in 1992 and named after him “B92” [5]. It
is based on only two nonorthogonal states associated
with the two values of the logical bit to-be-secretly-
transmitted. Despite its simplicity, the B92 is considered
as a quite impractical protocol, mainly for its low toler-
ance to the losses and noise of a communication chan-
nel [6]. The high dependance on channel losses can be
ascribed to the so-called Unambiguous State Discrimi-
nation (USD) attack [7], which represents the principal
threat against the B92, and severely limits its perfor-
mances. On the other side, the high dependance on the
channel noise can be imputed to the lack of a direct
phase-error estimation, which entails a more than nec-
essary privacy amplification as soon as the noise sensibly
increases.
So far, no solution has been devised to improve the
phase-error estimation of B92, and only one solution is
available to contrast the USD attack. It was originally
proposed in [5], and recently proved unconditional secure
in [8] and [9]. It consists of a strong reference pulse ac-
companying the signal pulse and phase-related to it. The
presence of the reference pulse prevents an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) from selectively stopping the signals according
to the results of an USD measurement. By adopting
the technology reported in [10], this solution would al-
low a secure QKD over distances of about 124 Km [9].
However the high intensity of the reference pulse is ex-
pected to cause in practice noise due to the scattering
inside an optical fiber [11], while if a weaker reference
pulse is used [12], the maximum distance drops to about
87 Km. Furthermore the solution of a strong reference
pulse cannot be applied if the B92 is realized with a
single-photon source or with SPDC (Spontaneous Para-
metric Down Conversion), because the beam intensities
cannot be modulated to the necessary extent. On the
contrary, a solution functioning at the single-photon level
could be at once transferred to a realistic scenario by
virtue of the decoy-state technique [13, 14, 15], which al-
lows the estimation of statistical quantities related to the
single-photon pulses only.
In this paper we propose a novel solution to make the
single-photon B92 robust against the losses and the noise
of a communication channel. First, the transmitter pre-
pares, besides the two conventional signal states, two ad-
ditional uninformative states. This modification alone is
very feasible and allows to detect the USD attack. The
protocol containing this first modification will be called
B92 henceforth. In contrast to the state-of-the-art, the
gain [16] of the single-photon B92 depends only linearly
on the loss rate of a communication channel rather than
nearly quadratically. This result is anticipated in Fig. 1.
As a second step, the receiver’s box is slightly modified
so to directly measure the phase-error of the B92, whose
estimation is known to be quite poor at large angles be-
tween the two signal states. The protocol containing both
the first and the second modifications will be called B92.
This further variant provides a higher tolerance to the
channel noise, approaching, when the two signal states
are nearly orthogonal, the one featured by the BB84 [17].
The main achievement of the paper is the formula-
tion of the B92. It relies on the observation that the
states of B92, being only two, are always linearly inde-
pendent. Since the USD attack is effective only on sets
of linearly independent states [18], it is quite natural to
introduce one more state to obtain a set of linearly de-
pendent states. This removes at the root the possibility
of an USD attack. Actually the states added in the new
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FIG. 1: (color online) Plots of the secure gain G as a function
of the channel loss rate L, for the standard B92 (black circles)
and for the B92 (red circles). The B92 scales linearly with
L, while the B92 scales nearly quadratically, and ceases to
provide a positive gain at about L = 0.6. The curves are
drawn assuming a depolarizing channel with p = 0.01 (see the
text). On the top-right, the states of traditional B92 (black
arrows) and the extra uninformative states (red arrows) used
in the two modifications of the B92 (see the text).
protocol are two rather than one; this depends on tech-
nical reasons related to the unconditional security proof
which will become clear later. The added states are un-
informative and after the quantum transmission are dis-
carded. Even so the users can measure the loss-rate per-
taining to these states and obtain a signature of Eve’s
presence. This solution resembles the decoy-state tech-
nique [13, 14, 15] used to realize a long-distance BB84 in
a realistic scenario; so we will call the extra uninforma-
tive states “decoy states” henceforth. However it should
be noted that the conventional decoy-state comes from
the intensity modulation of a certain pulse, i.e. from the
modulation of a degree of freedom different from the one
in which information is encoded; on the contrary, in the
present case, the decoy-state is encoded in the same de-
gree of freedom of the signal states, and there is no mod-
ulation in other degrees of freedom different from that.
This is a relevant peculiarity of the B92 since it entails
that no additional hardware respect to a standard B92
setup is required to implement the new protocol.
In the next, we focus on the B92, leaving the B92 for
the conclusion of the paper. It should be noted however
that all the results obtained for the former protocol, in
particular its unconditional security, hold for the latter
protocol as well; so they will be given without repeating
unnecessary security proofs.
Our work is structured as follows: in Section II we
briefly review the security proof of the standard B92,
to intuitively explaining the idea of using uninformative
states to protect against the USD attack. Then, in Sec-
tion III, we introduce the B92 and provide the proof of its
unconditional security. In Section IV we show, with the
help of numerical simulations, the independence of the
new protocol from the losses of a communication chan-
nel. In Section V, we detail the B92, in which the users
perform a direct estimate of the phase-error rate. The
concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Let us introduce the notation to explain the B92
protocol. We write the bit encoded by the transmit-
ter (Alice) as j = {0, 1} and the corresponding qubit
as |ϕj〉 ≡ β |0x〉 + (−1)j α |1x〉, where {|0x〉 , |1x〉} are
the eigenstates of the X basis, β = cos θ
2
, α = sin θ
2
,
0 < θ < pi/2 (see Fig.1). The bases X and Z are related
by |jz〉 =
[|0x〉+ (−1)j |1x〉
]
/
√
2. We can also intro-
duce the state
∣∣ϕj
〉
= α|0x〉 − (−1)jβ|1x〉 orthogonal to
|ϕj〉. It is possible now to define a general USD measure-
ment, parametrized by γ, asMγB92 ≡ {F γ0 , F γ1 , F γinc, Fv},
with F γ0 =
(
γ2
2β2 |ϕ1〉 〈ϕ1|
)
, F γ1 =
(
γ2
2β2 |ϕ0〉 〈ϕ0|
)
, F γinc =
1−F γ0 −F γ1 , Fv = |v〉 〈v|; |v〉 is a state that includes both
vacuum and multi-photon pulses, whose occurrences de-
pends on L, the total loss-rate of the communication
channel, which is under Eve’s control. It is maybe use-
ful to point out that the operators F γ0 , F
γ
1 and F
γ
inc live
in the subspace characterized by the single-photon pro-
jector Πs, while Fv lives in the complementary subspace
1 − Πs. Note that we are assuming for simplicity a per-
fect single-photon source for Alice and ideal detectors
for Bob. More precisely Bob’s detectors can discrimi-
nate vacuum, single-photon and multi-photon pulses, and
they are modeled like a beam-splitter with transmission
ηB, controlled by Eve, followed by detectors with unit
efficiency. The control by Eve on detectors is taken
into account by including ηB in the loss-rate L. We
remark that the assumption of a perfect single-photon
source can be dropped if the standard decoy-state tech-
nique [13, 14, 15] is brought into the description. Also,
we define for later use F γconc = (F
γ
0 + F
γ
1 ) = (A
γ
fil)
2, and
we include in the term “vacuum” both the vacuum and
the multi-photon events. Finally, we observe that the
measurement MγB92 is optimal when γ = 1, while it is
practical when γ = β [19]. While the receiver (Bob),
due to his limited technology, can execute just the prac-
tical measurementMβB92, Eve is supposed to be endowed
with superior technology, so she can execute the optimal
M1B92, with even the additional condition L = 0. In fact
we conservatively assume that Eve completely controls
the channel, so all the losses and noises are caused by
her.
The unconditional security of a lossless B92 was proved
for the first time in [20] and that of a lossy B92 in [21].
It is shown there that the Prepare-and-Measure (PM)
B92, experimentally accessible to Alice and Bob, can be
3obtained through a reduction argument by another pro-
tocol based on Entanglement Distillation (ED) [22]. The
ED protocol is not really implemented by the users; it
is rather a theoretical tool to find the conditions under
which the B92 operations can lead to the distillation of
the maximally entangled state
∣∣Φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0x〉A |0x〉B + |1x〉A |1x〉B) , (1)
starting from the state
|Ψ〉AB =
1√
2
(|0z〉A |ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A |ϕ1〉B)
= β |0x〉A |0x〉B + α |1x〉A |1x〉B , (2)
which explicitly contains the two signal qubits.
The reduction from the ED to the PM protocol is ob-
tained by noting that the measurementMβB92 effected by
Bob in the PM protocol is equivalent in the ED protocol
to a Z-basis measurement conditional on the successful
filtering operations Qv ≡ {Fv, 1− Fv} and Aβfil. In par-
ticular, when the filters are successful, the Bell state (1)
is obtained with probability 2α2β2 by the state (2), if
the channel is lossless and noiseless [23]. Once the users
share the state (1) they can obtain a secure key by the
subsequent measurement in the Z basis.
Nonetheless, in real situations, the channel is not
lossless and noiseless, so the filtered states may
include nbit bit errors, represented by the states
{|0z〉A|1z〉B, |1z〉A|0z〉B}, and nph phase errors, repre-
sented by the states {|0x〉A|1x〉B, |1x〉A|0x〉B}. Alice
and Bob must then resort to an ED based on CSS
codes [24, 25] in order to correct the errors and distill
the Bell state (1). This procedure needs not to be ac-
tually accomplished by the users; it suffices that they
provide reliable upper bounds to the number of bit er-
rors and phase errors present in their data. This is the
main breakthrough of the security proof given in [4].
Bit errors can be directly estimated by sacrificing a
part of the data, which are publicly revealed on the clas-
sical channel. On the contrary phase errors can not be di-
rectly estimated in B92. This is due to the fact the none
of the operations of this protocol can be made equiva-
lent to a measurement in the X basis. To cope with
this problem, it is useful to devise a gedanken experi-
ment in which Alice and Bob perform a measurement of
the state (2) in the X basis. In this way the gedanken
outcomes can be put in relation with measurable quan-
tities of the protocol. Let us indicate with |ix〉A|jx〉B
(i = {0, 1}, j = {0, 1, v}) the gedanken outcomes, and
with ni,j the number of their occurrences. Then, by look-
ing at the second of Eqs.(2), and by considering Bob’s
measurement MβB92, we can easily obtain the following
relations, valid in the asymptotic limit of largeN [20, 21]:
nph = β
2n01 + α
2n10 , (3)
α2N = n10 + n11 + n1v . (4)
Eq. (3) quantifies, in terms of gedanken quantities, the
number of phase errors; it contains n01 and n10 which can
be put in relation to measurable quantities through an ar-
gument based on quantum theory [20]. Eq. (4) is a direct
consequence of the fact that neither Eve nor the channel
can access Alice’s qubit as long as it is in Alice’s hands; it
contains the crucial parameter n1v, which quantifies the
effective nonorthogonality of the signal states in presence
of losses. In fact, consider the case of a lossless channel,
i.e. n1v = 0. From Eq.(4) we can see that the quantity
∆ = n10 + n11 measures the degree of nonorthogonality
of the two signal states, being it equal to α2N , and be-
ing 1− 2α2 equal to the scalar product of the two signal
states. When losses are taken into account, ∆ still repre-
sents the nonorthogonality of the two states on a loss-free
channel, but this time it is equal to α2N − n1v, smaller
than before. This means that losses have increased the
orthogonality of the two states, making the B92 more
prone to USD and other loss-based attacks. So it is im-
portant to include n1v in the phase estimation process,
for its optimization is directly related to the amount of
information leaked to Eve through a loss-based mecha-
nism. By executing the numerical search of the phase
error upper bound, it turns out that the optimal value
for n1v is zero in most of the cases. Below, we show that
it suffices to consider the USD attack to intuitively ex-
plain this value.
The USD attack is performed by Eve via the optimal
measurementM1B92, executed on the qubits prepared by
Alice. Let us consider the signal states {|ϕ0〉 , |ϕ1〉} and
the X-basis states {|0x〉 , |1x〉}. A conclusive outcome is
obtained by Eve for these four states with the following
probabilities:
PUSDϕ0 = P
USD
ϕ1 = 1− cos θ, (5)
PUSD0x = 0, P
USD
1x
= 1. (6)
If the result is conclusive, Eve forwards the qubit (in the
correct state) to Bob; otherwise she stops the qubit and
creates a loss in the channel. So, while in case of no attack
the four states are expected to arrive at Bob’s detectors
with the same probability, in case of USD attack, the
users would detect Ns(1− cos θ) signal states, Nd states
|1x〉 and 0 states |0x〉, where Ns and Nd are respectively
the total number of signal and decoy states prepared by
Alice. Note that this implies in case of USD attack the
following setting:
n1v = 0. (7)
In standard B92 the users can not measure the loss-rates
of Eq.(6), so they conservatively assume that Eve exe-
cuted an USD attack even if she actually did not, whence
Eq.(7). But the loss-rates of Eq.(6) become measurable
in B92, because of the presence of two uninformative
states which are chosen on purpose equal to |0x〉 and
|1x〉. This is the main feature that makes the new proto-
col independent of losses.
4III. PROTOCOL AND UNCONDITIONAL
SECURITY
In the B92, Alice prepares the two signal states
{|ϕ0〉 , |ϕ1〉} plus two additional uninformative decoy
states {|ϕd〉 , |ϕd′〉}, which are chosen respectively equal
to the states {|1x〉 , |0x〉}. Here we consider two decoy
states only, but the use of three or more decoy states
could be useful to adverse other kinds of USD-based at-
tacks, like those described in [26, 28]. Notice that the
addition of two decoy states makes the overall states pre-
pared by Alice linearly dependent; hence is impossible for
Eve to unambiguously discriminate them. More impor-
tantly, the presence of two decoy states, prepared with
suitable probabilities, makes the signal and decoy density
matrices identical. This is fundamental for the uncondi-
tional security proof of the protocol, because it prevents
Eve from behaving differently with signals and decoys,
and legitimates the use of random sampling arguments
between the two classes of pulses prepared by Alice. Let
us write explicitly the density matrix of the signal states:
ρ = (|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|+ |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|)/2
= β2|0x〉〈0x|+ α2|1x〉〈1x|. (8)
The above equation explains why we chose the decoy
states equal to the X-basis states {|1x〉 , |0x〉}. More-
over, the requirement of equal density matrices for signal
and decoy states fixes the preparation probability of the
states |1x〉 (i.e. |ϕd〉) and |0x〉 (i.e. |ϕd′〉) respectively
to α2 and β2. After the whole quantum transmission
the decoy instances are discarded. Even so, they allow
the direct estimate of the crucial quantity n1v previously
introduced.
For the security proof of B92 we adopt the same ar-
gument as in [21]: we introduce below the PM B92 and
show that it can be obtained by an ED protocol through
a reduction argument. Then we show the unconditional
security of the ED protocol by applying it to a Shor-
Preskill security proof [4].
PM B92 – (i) Alice randomly and uniformly prepares
2N signal qubits in the state |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉, α2N decoy
qubits in the state |ϕd〉 and β2N decoy qubits in the
state |ϕd′〉. – (ii) Bob executes the measurement MβB92:
in case he obtains |v〉 he labels the outcome as ‘vacuum’;
in case he obtains |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉 he labels the outcomes
as ‘inconclusive’; in case he obtains |ϕ0〉 (|ϕ1〉) he labels
the outcome as ‘conclusive’ and decodes as ‘1’ (‘0’). –
(iii) After the quantum transmission, the users randomly
permute their bits. Then Bob tells Alice the positions of
vacuum, inconclusive and conclusive counts. Alice cal-
culates the number nkv of joint occurrences {|ϕk〉 , |v〉}
(k = {0, 1, d, d′}) between her preparation and Bob’s
measurement, the number nv =
∑
k nkv of total vacuum
counts, and the number nconc of conclusive counts. She
announces the estimated quantities to Bob together with
the positions of decoy bits. – (iv) The data correspond-
ing to decoy or inconclusive outcomes are removed by the
users. – (v) The first half of the remaining bits (check
bits) are used for estimating the number of errors nerr in
which Alice prepared |ϕ0〉 (|ϕ1〉) and Bob decoded as ‘1’
(‘0’). – (vi) From nv, nerr, nconc, and ndv the users esti-
mate the number of bit errors nbit, and an upper bound
on the number of phase errors nph in the second half of
the remaining bits (data bits). – (vii) The users perform
error correction and privacy amplification on the data
bits according to the values of nbit and nph respectively,
thus obtaining an nkey-bit shared secret key.
In the following we provide the ED protocol that we
show to be unconditionally secure, and that will eventu-
ally reduce to the PM B92.
ED B92 – (i) Alice prepares 3N copies of the bipar-
tite state given in Eq.(2) and sends the 3N systems B
to Bob over the quantum channel. – (ii) Alice and Bob
randomly permute by public discussion the positions of
all their pairs. – (iii) Bob performs the QND measure-
ment described by Qv = {Fv, 1− Fv}, and publicly an-
nounces the outcomes [29]; let nv be the number of out-
comes associated with Fv. – (iv) For the first N pairs
(decoy pairs), Alice measures system A in the X basis,
and publicly announces the positions of the decoy pairs.
Since neither Eve, Bob nor the channel can touch Alice’s
qubits, we can infer from Eq.(2) that she will obtain |0x〉
with probability β2 and |1x〉 with probability α2. Alice
counts the number n1v of joint occurrences {|1x〉, Fv} in
the outcomes. Then the users discard these results. –
(v) For half of the remaining pairs (check pairs), Alice
measures system A in the Z basis, and Bob performs the
measurementMβB92 on his system. By public discussion,
they determine the number nerr of errors in which Alice
found ‘0’ (‘1’) and Bob’s outcome was ‘1’ (‘0’). – (vi)
For the other half of the remaining pairs (data pairs),
Bob performs the filtering Aβfil on each of his qubits, and
announces the positions and the total number nfil of the
qubits that have passed the filtering. – (vii) From nv,
nerr, nfil and n1v the users estimate an upper bound for
the number of bit errors nbit and phase errors nph, in the
nfil pairs. – (viii) They run an ED protocol that can
produce nkey nearly perfect EPR pairs if the estimation
is correct. – (ix) Alice and Bob each measures the EPR
pairs in Z basis to obtain an nkey-bit shared secret key.
The unconditional security of our protocol follows the
proof given in [21] after minor modifications. Actually, all
the operations and measurements in our entanglement-
based protocol, with exception of Step (iv), are purposely
chosen equal to [21] to maximally exploit the results ob-
tained there.
The first step is to show the equivalence of the two pro-
tocols given above. For that, it suffices to note that Eve
can not distinguish the preparation of the decoy states
{|ϕd〉 , |ϕd′〉} in the PM protocol from that of {|1x〉 , |0x〉}
in the ED protocol, effected through a X basis mea-
surement, since the resulting states are the same, they
5are prepared with the same probabilities and the time
at which Alice performs the X basis measurement can
not have an influence on the results. This also implies
that the quantity ndv of the PM protocol corresponds to
the quantity n1v of the ED protocol. For the same rea-
son Eve cannot distinguish the preparation of the signal
states in the PM protocol from that in the ED one. Fur-
thermore, from the definitions of F βconc and A
β
fil, it can
be easily seen that the sequence of filters {(1−Fv), Aβfil}
is equivalent to the operator F βconc measured with a per-
fect detector. This also implies that the quantity nconc
of the PM protocol corresponds to the quantity nfil of
the ED protocol.
Regarding the security of the ED B92, the only point
that deserves some care is the estimation of the quantity
n1v by means of the decoy states. In particular we must
show that this estimation is exponentially reliable. For
that we take inspiration from the estimation of the bit-
error rate, which follows closely the standard B92 [20, 21].
The number nbit of bit errors in the data pairs can be de-
duced from the number nerr of errors in the check pairs
obtained in the above ED-B92, Step (v). The argument is
that in order to obtain nbit, Alice and Bob should perform
Z basis measurements on the data pairs. Despite these
measurements are not really performed on data pairs,
they are performed on the check pairs. This is because
the measurement MβB92 is equivalent to a Z measure-
ment conditional on the outcome (1 − Fv) of Qv and on
the successful filtering Aβfil. Since in Step (ii) all the pairs
are randomly permuted, the check pairs can be seen as
a classical random sample of all the pairs remained after
Step (iv). This leads to the inequality |nbit − nerr| ≤ Nε
which is exponentially reliable for large N .
We can apply the same argument to the decoy pairs. In
order to obtain n1v Alice and Bob should perform X
basis and QND measurements on their data pairs. Al-
though these measurements are not really performed on
data pairs, they are performed on decoy pairs in Step
(iv) of the ED protocol. Then, because of the random
permutation of Step (ii), the decoy pairs can be regarded
as a classical random sample of the 3N pairs prepared by
Alice. Hence we obtain that the estimation of n1v in our
modified B92 is exponentially reliable and can be used
in the numerical optimization of the phase-error upper
bound. In the next Section we will show the practical
advantages of such a direct estimation.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
To see the practical advantages of the B92 consider a
channel with total loss rate L. If there is no eavesdrop-
ping in the line it is natural to expect (see Eq.(4)) that:
n1v = α
2NL. (9)
Eq.(9) can be experimentally verified in the B92; this
represents the main advantage of the new protocol. On
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FIG. 2: (color online) Relative phase-error upper-bound Λph
(top diagram) and secure gain G (bottom diagram) of the
B92 versus the squared scalar product of the two signal states
|〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|
2, for channel transmission η = {0, 10, 20, 30} dB and
depolarizing rate p = 0.01. The vertical dotted lines at 0.322
(θ = 55.4◦) and 0.538 (θ = 42.8◦) mark respectively the max-
imum of G and the minimum of Λph.
the contrary, as already mentioned, Alice and Bob can
by no means verify Eq.(9) in the standard B92, so they
must choose n1v = 0, according to the worst-case scenario
described by Eq.(7).
The settings of Eqs.(7),(9) lead to the two curves of
Fig.1, which represent the gain G as a function of the loss
rate L for the traditional B92 and for the B92. The gain
is given by G = nfil [1− h (nbit/nfil)− h (nph/nfil)],
where nph is the phase-error upper-bound, and h is the
Shannon entropy [30]. The curves are drawn assum-
ing, as in [21], a depolarizing channel with losses ρ →
L(1− p) |V 〉 〈V | + (1 − L)
[
(1 − p)ρ+∑i=x,y,z (σiρσi)
]
,
where |V 〉 is the vacuum state, σi are the Pauli matri-
ces and p, taken equal to 0.01 in our simulations, is the
depolarizing rate. The plot pertaining to the B92 is re-
lated to Eq.(9); on the contrary that pertaining to the
standard B92 comes from Eq.(7), and contains the same
results given in [21] for a B92 on a lossy channel. From
the two plots is apparent that our technique leads to a
linear decrease of the gain with the loss rate of the chan-
nel, rather than that, nearly quadratic, of the standard
B92. Only for L = 0 the standard B92 features a higher
gain. This is due to the presence of decoy states that go
discarded in the B92.
For the lossy depolarizing channel given above, the bit-
error rate can be easily found to be equal to (1− L)p/3,
while that of filtered states is (1 − L)[4p + 3 + (4p −
3) cos(2θ)]/12; hence their ratio, i.e. the relative bit-
error rate, is independent of losses. In the B92 even the
upper-bounded relative phase-error, Λph = nph/nfil, is
independent of losses. This can be realized by observing
the top diagram of Fig. 2, where we plotted Λph ver-
6sus the squared scalar product of the two signal states,
|〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2, for several values of the total transmittance
η = 1 − L. The points pertaining to different values of
the transmittance follow all the same curve, thus demon-
strating the independence of Λph from losses.
From the bottom diagram of Fig. 2, containing the gain
as a function of |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2, we can learn that, regard-
less of the transmittance, the maximum gain is obtained
when the two signal states are separated by an angle
θ ≃ 55.4◦, while the minimum phase-error upper-bound
is obtained when θ ≃ 42.8◦. This is in sharp contrast
with the standard theory of B92 [21],[12], which assigns
very small values to θ to prevent the USD attack, thus
reducing substantially the final rate.
Since the relative bit-error and phase-error rates are
loss-independent, we can use the results of the lossless
B92 [20] to give an estimate of the single-photon B92
working distance when practical devices are taken into
account. It is found in [20] that the maximum depo-
larizing rate p∗ for which the gain of the lossless single-
photon B92 is still positive is p∗ = 0.033. In real ap-
paratuses, the depolarizing rate is given essentially by
detectors dark counts, which become dominant when the
quantum signal becomes too low. In [10] the dark count
probability is pdark = 1.7× 10−6, the attenuation of the
fiber is ξ = 0.21 dB/Km, the mean detectors efficiency
is 0.045 and the single-photon detection probability is
ps(l) = 0.045 × 10−ξl/10, with l the distance between
the users. From the inequality p = pdark/ps(l) ≤ p∗ we
can easily obtain a working distance equal to about 140
Km. This value can be compared with the ones achieved
by other protocols under similar circumstances. For ex-
ample it is known that the maximum depolarizing rate
of BB84 is p∗ = 0.165 [4], which implies a working dis-
tance of about 173 Km, while that of SARG04 [31] is
p∗ = 0.080 [32] with a corresponding distance of 158 Km.
The difference between the protocols depends crucially
on their tolerance of the channel noise, as exemplified
by the above values of the depolarizing rate. One way
to make a protocol more tolerant to noise is to improve
its phase-error rate estimation. We accomplish this task
in the next section by slightly modifying the measuring
apparatus of the receiver Bob.
V. IMPROVED PHASE-ERROR ESTIMATE
With reference to the above-described ED protocol,
in order to directly measure nph, Alice and Bob should
perform X basis measurements on their data pairs, and
publicly compare their results on the classical channel.
However in this way their data pairs could be no more
used to distill a secret key, so this procedure is usually
substituted by the estimation of the phase-error on a sub-
sampling of the data pairs, the check pairs, which are
representative of the whole sample. This is what happens
in the BB84 for example [4, 17]. Nevertheless such an
estimation procedure cannot be done in the standard B92
and neither in our modified version B92. The reason is
that although Alice prepares with a certain probability
the states in the X basis, i.e. the decoy states, Bob
never measures them in the X basis. By consequence,
even in B92 the phase-error can not be directly estimated
and must be indirectly upper bounded from the values
of other quantities like nv, nerr, nfil and n1v, through a
numerical optimization algorithm.
As already mentioned, it is possible to further mod-
ify the B92 to introduce such a direct estimation of the
phase-error rate, and make it more resistant to noise.
The resulting protocol is the B92. It consists in a random
switch of Bob’s measurement between the MβB92 and a
measurement in the X basis. From the instances related
to the X basis measurement the users can obtain a direct
estimation of the phase-error of the channel, as it hap-
pens in the BB84. So, in particular, this is achieved by
modifying the following Steps of the given PM protocol:
(ii’) Bob executes the measurementMβB92 with probabil-
ity 1/2 and the measurement in the X basis with proba-
bility 1/2 and takes note of outcomes; [–].
(iii’) After the quantum transmission, Bob tells Alice the
positions of vacuum, conclusive and inconclusive counts
and those of his measurements in the X basis ; [–]. She
announces the estimated quantities to Bob together with
the positions and the values of decoy bits. All the in-
stances in which Alice prepared signal states and Bob
measured in the X basis are discarded.
(iv’) Bob estimates the number of errors nph in the de-
coy instances in which Alice prepared |1x〉 (|0x〉) and Bob
detected |0x〉 (|1x〉); [–].
(vi’) From nerr the users estimate the number of bit er-
rors nbit.
The slight increase in the complexity of Bob’s mea-
surement, and the decrease in the final rate entailed by
the new Step (iii’), are compensated by the benefits of
a better tolerance to the channel noise. By assuming
again a depolarizing channel, it can be easily seen that
the tolerable depolarizing rate p∗ depends directly on the
angle θ between the two signal states: the greater θ the
larger p∗. This is summarized in Table I. It can be seen
θ 10◦ 20◦ 30◦ 40◦ 50◦ 60◦ 70◦ 80◦ 90◦
p∗(%) 0.4 1.5 3.4 5.9 8.6 11.5 14.0 15.8 16.5
TABLE I: The maximum depolarizing rate tolerable by the
B92, and the corresponding angle θ between the two signal
states. The depolarizing rates for BB84 [17] and SARG04 [31]
are respectively 16.5% [4] and 8.04% [32].
that the tolerable depolarizing rate can be increased up
to the BB84 level, and well above the SARG04 thresh-
old. However we note incidentally that a similar solution
for a direct phase-error estimation can be applied to the
SARG04 protocol by modifying only its classical data
processing. Let us also notice that the unconditional se-
curity of the B92 follows closely that of the B92; in fact
7the decoy instances are used as a classical sampling to
provide an exponentially reliable bound to the phase er-
rors.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion we have shown that a pair of uninforma-
tive states can be introduced in the single-photon B92
protocol in order to remove its high dependance on the
losses and noise of a communication channel. In particu-
lar, without modifying the receiver’s box, the technique
can prevent at the root an USD attack by Eve. Further-
more, with a slight modification of Bob’s measurement,
the technique allows a direct estimation of the number of
phase errors, thus increasing the robustness of the proto-
col against external sources of noise.
The results are of theoretical interest since they solve at
the root the long-standing problem of the unambiguous
state discrimination of the two single-photon B92 signal
states. In fact, other protocols based on similar princi-
ples could benefit of our analysis [33, 34]. Furthermore,
although the results are limited to the single-photon case,
they are easily exportable to a realistic scenario by apply-
ing the well established decoy-state technique [13, 14, 15].
The presented method can be extended to more than
two uninformative states, with the potential of diverting
other USD-based attacks [26, 27, 28], possibly related to
a non-ideal equipment of the users. Another option is
to adapt the proposed solution to the B92 with a not-so-
strong reference pulse [12]; this would allow to use in that
protocol a wider angle between the signal states, thus re-
ducing the problem of a precise phase stabilization.
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